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Executive summary
The multilateral trading system is seriously threatened by the country which has been 
its main inspirer, the United States. The US position is focused on bilateral trade imbalances 
presumably resulting from unbalanced trade policies, but it is flawed. Not only does it make 
little sense given the existence of global value chains, but it also misses its target: what matters 
most are aggregate trade surpluses and deficits, which depend above all on the differential 
between domestic investment and savings, and little on trade policy.
This Policy Contribution first analyses the economic consequences of a full-scale trade 
war. Our estimates show that it would have a permanent effect of a similar magnitude on the 
GDP per capita of the three major global powers (the European Union, the United States and 
China) of around 3 percent to 4 percent of GDP, as big as the effect of the Great Recession of 
2008-09. The impact would be much more damaging for small countries. By contrast, the EU 
is partly protected by the size of its internal market. In addition, the short-term effects would 
be even greater because of the negative supply and demand shock the global economy would 
be subjected to. For this reason, the EU must engage resolutely in a strategy of defence of 
trade multilateralism.
We recommend combining the adoption of firm and credible retaliatory measures in 
response to the current attacks with an offer of multilateral or plurilateral negotiations on 
legitimate issues: macroeconomic imbalances, institutional design of dispute settlement at 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO), reciprocity of commitments and updating of rules on 
subsidies, state-owned enterprises and intellectual property rights. However, considering 
how difficult plurilateral and multilateral negotiations with the US administration are, Europe 
needs a plan B. In the short term, this requires, for instance, coordinating a club of countries 
in order to identify and implement strategies to circumvent US blocking of the WTO at the 
Appellate Body level.
In addition, we recommend pursuing an ambitious policy of trade agreements. The 
expected economic gains are modest. But trade agreements can play an additional role of 
insurance policies in case of full-scale trade war and can be used as leverage on other non-
trade issues. Therefore, these agreements should change and address two main concerns 
about globalisation: environmental protection with the issue of global warming and problems 
related to tax evasion and optimisation.
We therefore recommend making the signing of trade agreements conditional on the 
adoption of the OECD’s action plan to combat erosion of the tax base and the implementation 
of the Paris Climate Agreement. We put forward progressive monitoring and sanction meas-
ures to ensure effective implementation.
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Globalisation, inequality and the rise of 
populism
Economists widely agree that international trade is an important source of benefits in terms 
of welfare. These benefits arise from better allocation of resources and greater economies of 
scale, and are reflected by lower production costs and prices and a greater variety of available 
products. There is a striking contrast with public opinion as several recent polls have shown 
(Printemps de l’Économie, 2018): 60 percent of French people have a negative opinion of 
globalisation and only 13 percent are favourable to deeper trade openness. The French are 
more critical of trade integration than the Germans: 75 percent of the French and 57 percent 
of Germans are favourable to greater protection against foreign competition. This fear of 
openness to international trade is part of a more general distrust: 47 percent of Americans 
and 36 percent of French people want more to be done to protect them from today’s world 
(IPSOS, 2017). At the same time, 68 percent of the French and 55 percent of Germans consider 
that globalisation increases social inequality. Economists broadly share these concerns 
and point out that over the last thirty years, increasing globalisation in trade has increased 
competition between markets, often at the expense of certain categories of workers in 
developed countries.
Several empirical studies1 have assessed the impact of increased imports from emerging 
and developing countries (mainly China) and the introduction of new technologies. While the 
increase in inequalities and the effects on wages and employment in developed countries can 
be partly attributed to the increase in imports from emerging and developing countries, these 
studies concluded, however, that technological change has played a more important role 
than trade. The studies2 found that the regional employment areas most exposed to compe-
tition from Chinese imports – intensive in unskilled work – are those that have experienced 
the greatest decline in manufacturing jobs. In the case of the United States, however, the 
increases in manufacturing jobs from total exports are of the same order of magnitude as job 
losses brought about by imports from China, so the net effect on jobs produced by trade in 
goods and services is probably globally very limited (Feenstra et al, 2017).
Finding 1: The destruction of jobs in the manufacturing sector and the increase in 
inequality are partly but not primarily due to the increase in trade.
 
The estimates in this Policy Contribution confirm economists’ view of international trade as 
a source of net benefits for countries that liberalise trade. Contrary to the view of the cur-
rent US administration, trade is a positive-sum game. These benefits are, however, unevenly 
distributed and create losers. The criteria and the arrangements for transferring gains from 
the winners to the losers of globalisation need to be reconsidered: with the possible exception 
of the Scandinavian countries, industrialised countries have failed to redistribute the benefits 
of globalisation. In this regard, the exclusive competence given to the European Commission 
in matters of trade policy justifies the implementation of a European instrument seeking to 
mitigate the negative consequences of trade liberalisation. While this instrument already 
exists in the form of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund, the tasks and resources as-
signed to it are manifestly insufficient3. It is certainly difficult to identify job losses specifically 
1 WTO (2017) gives an overview of this literature; according to the cases studied, opening up to trade is alleged to be 
responsible for 20 percent of job losses.
2 This is in particular the case for the impact of Chinese imports on the US manufacturing sector; see Author et al 
(2013) and Malgouyres (2017).
3 Provided with a budget of €500 million per year when it was created in 2006, the resources of the European Glo-
balisation Adjustment Fund were reduced to €150 million a year in the 2014-20 budget because of its under-use. 
For an analysis of the operation of the current system and proposals for reforms, see Claeys and Sapir (2018).
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attributable to trade liberalisation, though it should not be an obstacle to European support 
for labour-market areas severely hit by unemployment. In addition, while trade globalisa-
tion requires resources, fiscal resources especially, to redistribute its benefits and effectively 
support the most vulnerable sections of society, financial globalisation, through the mobility 
of capital, of production and of the taxable base – in particular that of large corporate groups – 
makes this redistribution more difficult. In practice, along with competition and tax optimi-
sation (or even tax evasion) it puts unprecedented pressure on our redistribution systems. 
Trade integration also acts as an incentive to tax competition as it facilitates the relocation 
of production in response to tax advantages. For this reason, the political sustainability of 
globalisation calls for trade liberalisation issues to be linked with tax competition issues. This 
sustainability is now being challenged in most advanced countries, which are confronted with 
movements of opinion in favour of greater protection. However, Guiso et al (2018) show that 
exposure to globalisation (as measured by the intensity of increased competition from Chi-
nese imports) is not the only explanation for the rise in populism. In the countries mostly hit 
by the financial crises in the euro area (2008-13), economic insecurity and the perceived ina-
bility of governments to protect them effectively against such crises have added to globalisa-
tion as factors explaining the rise in populism (Guiso et al, 2018). There is also a parallel with 
the situation in the 1930s as recent work by economic historians shows that it was in countries 
that were unable (because of the gold standard) or unwilling to use monetary instruments to 
stimulate their economies that protectionist temptations were the strongest.
Finding 2. The rise of populism is not only or even primarily fuelled by trade openness 
but rather by the sense of economic insecurity and growing inequalities.
 
A repeated aim of the Trump administration is to reduce bilateral trade deficits (in particular 
with China and Germany). This focus on bilateral deficits and surpluses rather than aggregate 
trade deficits and surpluses is flawed. Bilateral imbalances are largely linked to the respec-
tive industrial structures or value chain mechanisms4. Since a country’s trade balance is not 
determined by its trade policy but rather reflects its net savings, increasing trade protection 
has no impact on this balance, as the real exchange rate is adjusted, either by the nominal 
exchange rate or by inflation, if the savings imbalance persists. At the bilateral level, the 
argument is even more incongruous, given the poor economic sense of the bilateral balance 
in a context where supply chains are widely internationalised. However, the aggregate trade 
deficits and surpluses of large countries are a relevant issue since the global imbalances they 
generate might partly explain the 2008-09 crisis. But these imbalances have little to do with 
trade policies (tariffs and trade agreements). There is no empirical correlation between trade 
balance and customs duties5. The current account is impacted by macroeconomic factors, 
such as fiscal policy, exchange rates, asset prices and productivity. In order to prevent the 
protectionist and populist contagion, governments should thus not hesitate to use macroeco-
nomic instruments to support the economy in the event of a crisis. While the macroeconomic 
response worked relatively well in 2009 at the G20 level, it was then defective, in particular in 
the euro area. We conclude from this that the debate on current imbalances should be shifted 
from bilateral trade issues to multilateral macroeconomic issues. While discussions on this 
subject can take place within the framework of the G7 or G20, the three main players are un-
doubtedly the USA, the EU (and in particular the euro area) and China (G3).
4 For example, Germany has an aggregate trade surplus (of €244.9 billion in 2017) and has bilateral deficits with a 
number of eastern European countries from which it imports intermediate goods. Gross bilateral deficits do not 
take into account the fact that the value of exported goods (eg from China to the US) represents not only the value 
added by Chinese companies but also the value of intermediate goods imported by China. This difference between 
gross bilateral deficit and added value is  about 40 percent in the case of the United States/China.
5 There is no robust international relationship between the level of trade protection and trade balance. See, for 
example, Gagnon (2017) or Hufbauer and Zhiyao (2016).
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Attacks on multilateralism and the 
uncomfortable position of the EU
Three decisions by the Trump administration constitute attacks on multilateral rules. The 
first, since 2017, concerned the blocking strategy on the appointment of new judges to the 
WTO Appellate Body, which could jeopardise the dispute resolution system. The Appellate 
Body, considered the ‘crown jewel’ of the WTO, is essential for the proper functioning of the 
international trading system, which relies on its ability to enforce the rules accepted by its 
members. The second decision (March 2018) was to invoke the national security argument 
to apply additional customs duties of 25 percent on steel imports and 10 percent on alumini-
um imports – which were implemented for the European Union on 1 June 2018 – amounting 
to $6.4 billion in total. In this context, the EU rightly believes that it is entitled to respond to 
unilateral US measures affecting the European Union, Canada and Japan. The fact that these 
countries are close allies invalidates the national defence argument. The EU adopted retali-
atory measures amounting to €2.8 billion (which could be extended by 2020 in case of WTO 
approval). The rejection by the European authorities of a voluntary export restriction – which 
would go against WTO rules – in exchange for an exemption from US tariffs is also part of 
the defence of multilateralism and an approach based on the rule of law. The third decision 
(March 2018) was to introduce tariffs of 25 percent on $50 billion worth of imports from Chi-
na, which the US administration accuses of infringements of intellectual property protection, 
threatening the US’s innovation capacity; in June 2018, customs duties threats of 10 percent 
on $200 billion of imports were added.
These decisions, taken as a whole, generate trade tensions, which are in themselves a 
source of uncertainty. One of the strengths of the WTO rules system at the outset was to 
reduce uncertainty about future tariffs. The current unpredictability will have a non-negligible 
impact, similar to the increase of tariffs, not only on trade itself but also on investment. The 
EU will therefore be a victim of this unpredictability, but the cost in terms of investment can 
be limited if the EU continues to act as a force for stability based on compliance with rules. 
However, the EU is in a unique position between China, with which it shares a commitment 
to the multilateral rules system, and the United States, with which it has several common 
grievances in relation to China. These include steel (for which China has excess production 
capacity), intellectual property and the Chinese state’s role in managing the economy. The 
‘Made in China’ agenda is as much a concern for the European Union as the ‘America First’ 
agenda of the Trump administration.
Finding 3. The current trade tension is a source of uncertainty and unpredictability that 
will have a negative impact on trade and investment.
Avoiding a trade war
What would be the effects of a full-scale trade war?
The scenario of protectionist escalation at global level can no longer be ruled out. The global 
system based on non-aggression tariff commitments is fragile. The economic literature has 
shown that a large economy, by making use of its market power, can impose customs duties 
to its advantage to lower the price of its imports or to encourage the relocation of industries to 
its territory. However, the current US trade aggression is more a response to political sec-
tor-based rather than economic-based motives. Due to value chains, most economists believe 
that the imposition of tariffs, in particular on intermediate goods such as steel and alumin-
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ium, will be to the detriment of the US economy as a whole, even without retaliation. There 
could, however, be a series of retaliations and counter-retaliations. How much can world 
tariffs increase if we move from the current cooperative equilibrium to the non-cooperative 
equilibrium of a trade war? Two simulation studies indicate that tariffs would increase by 30 
or 60 percentage points in trade war scenarios (Nicita et al, 2018; Ossa, 2014).
An estimate of the long-term impact of the most dramatic scenario was established with 
a 60 percentage points increase in tariffs on manufactured goods between the world’s major 
countries (currently below 3 percent on average for the US and the EU) and restrictions on 
trade in services (Vicard, 2018). The European single market (post-Brexit) in this scenario 
remains intact and customs duties remain zero within the EU. Two scenarios are then consid-
ered: the first scenario, that of a full-scale trade war, where the new tariffs are applied every-
where except within the EU and the second scenario, involving a limited trade war, where the 
tariffs are not applied either within the EU or between countries that have signed bilateral 
trade agreements.
The methodology we use exploits the most recent developments in academic literature 
described as ‘new quantitative trade models’ (see Mayer et al, 2018). It can be broken down 
into two stages. The first involves estimating the impact of tariffs and various types of regional 
trade agreements on trade based on historical precedents (data on international trade 
between 1948 and 2016). This makes it possible to simulate the impact of a change in costs 
on all trade flows between two partners. This exercise takes diversion effects into account: 
for example, an increase in customs duties between the United States and the European 
Union destroys trade between them but increases France’s trade with its European partners. 
The second stage involves translating this variation in a country’s trade openness into an 
impact on its real income. These simulations reflect the long-term impact of a trade war after 
adjustments in jobs and wages have been made: they thus underestimate certain short- to 
medium-term effects.
The consequences of a global trade war, in % of GDP
Source: Vicard (2018). Note: RoW = rest of world.
The ‘full-scale war’ case shows that the permanent loss of GDP would be more than 4 
percent for the EU and more than 3 percent for France (Figure 1), ie an annual average loss of 
€1,250 per capita in the EU and €1,125 per capita in France. These losses are the direct conse-
quence of a sharp fall in trade. For example, France’s trade outside the EU would fall by about 
42 percent. The smaller and more open the countries are, the more they are affected with 
larger losses by the increase in production costs (through the destruction of value chains) 
and consumer prices and by the loss of markets. In a global trade war scenario, EU countries 
are partly protected by their membership of the European internal market. However, this fall 
of more than 3 percent in GDP for France should be compared to the loss of potential GDP 
that France suffered following the Great Recession of 2008-09, estimated to be 2.2 percent by 
Ollivaud and Turner (2015). This calls into question the US assertion that the EU and China 
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would be the only losers in a trade war. A remarkable result of these simulations is that the 
losses of the three major trading powers (the United States, China and the EU) are roughly 
equivalent, namely around 3 percent for China and the United States and 4 percent for the 
EU. For other open countries, these losses are much higher (more than 10 percent for Ireland, 
Canada, Switzerland, Mexico and Korea). Moreover, the literature has documented the long-
term negative dynamic effects of an increase in customs barriers on long-term growth, in 
particular through the emergence of an administered economy that is not conducive to inno-
vation and to the proper allocation of production factors6. Models integrating this decrease in 
productivity growth deriving from protectionism result in much higher permanent losses (at 
least doubled) (Sampson, 2016).
Finding 4. A global trade war would have a permanent effect on the three major global 
powers (EU, United States and China), of similar magnitude to that of the Great 
Recession of 2008-09.
 
These estimates underestimate short- to medium-term effects since the macroeconomic and 
financial impact is not taken into account on this time scale. In the short- to medium-term, 
the sharp loss of purchasing power brought about by the increase in taxes worldwide should 
trigger a negative demand shock and a negative supply shock as well, because of the rise in 
the price of intermediate goods in global production chains. In addition, the fall in world 
trade would cause a major sectoral adjustment with large-scale job losses in exporting sec-
tors that would not be able to be quickly offset by job creation in importing sectors, with a 
resulting sharp increase in unemployment. Several other mechanisms could have a nega-
tive impact: higher risk premiums in financial markets, increased uncertainty and possible 
tightening of monetary policy by central banks in response to inflationary pressures gener-
ated by tariffs7. The counter argument, however, is that the announcement of Brexit, which 
actually opened an era of uncertainty for the UK, did not, despite the recent slowdown in UK 
growth relative to its European partners, trigger the recession that some economists may have 
feared. Does this mean that the risks of a trade war, with uncertainties that go with them, are 
overestimated? We do not think so as, in the particular case of Brexit, the United Kingdom 
was able to benefit, at least in the short term, from a sharp depreciation of its currency, which 
dampened the shock. Since, in the event of a trade war, the shock would be global, exchange 
rate adjustments would reflect the relative effects on each country (smaller countries more 
affected than larger ones would see their currencies depreciate) but would not reduce the 
global shock itself.
Other scenarios of more limited trade wars – such as the United States against China or 
the United States against the EU – are also possible, even if they are more difficult to model. 
Assuming an additional tariff of 25 percent applied to all products traded between the United 
States and China, bilateral trade would be reduced by almost 60 percent, while Chinese 
exports to the EU would increase by 10 percent and European exports to the United States 
would increase by 7 percent (Bellora et al, 2018). However, if the US were to impose a number 
of anti-dumping measures against Chinese imports, this would create a more damaging redi-
rection of flows to the EU8. Another scenario is that of a bilateral agreement to the detriment 
of the EU. Although vague and not at time of writing confirmed, the agreement of 20 May 
2018 between China and the United States, through which China would commit to purchase 
more US goods, would have the same effect as the imposition of Chinese tariffs on imports of 
foreign goods other than from the United States. It is to be feared that this type of agreement 
6 See, for example, Aghion et al (2018), Berthou et al (2016) and et al (2016).
7 For the first time in April 2018, the US Federal Reserve raised concerns in the ‘Beige Book’ about the possible 
imposition of tariffs on manufacturing imports.
8 US anti-dumping measures increase imports from the targeted countries to the EU by around 13 percent; see 
Skoglund (2018).
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will proliferate, thereby fundamentally calling multilateralism into question.
Safeguarding multilateralism
Given the strategy of an aggressive attack on multilateralism by the current US administration 
in several domains such as trade (blocking of the Dispute Settlement Body, DSB and customs 
duties), environment (withdrawal from the Paris Agreement), and diplomacy (withdrawal 
from the Iranian Agreement), the EU definitely needs to implement a defence strategy. Re-
taliation in proportion to unjustified US protectionist measures, together with a complaint to 
the WTO, are the only short-term options. To be effective, such retaliation should be coordi-
nated with countries with which the EU has trade agreements (such as Canada and Japan). 
The purpose of such retaliation is to increase the cost of a unilateral protectionist policy for 
the non-cooperative country, since the suspension of concessions (ie the increase in customs 
duties) for a partner that violates its commitments is one of the fundamental principles of the 
WTO dispute settlement system.
Recommendation 1. Make the protection of multilateralism the European Union’s priority. 
In the short term, the European Union should coordinate with its main trading 
partners the adoption of firm, proportionate retaliation in response to attacks on 
multilateralism.
 
Furthermore, it is necessary to try to escape the political deadlock into which the US adminis-
tration is pushing its partners by putting on the table a proposal for multilateral negotiations 
on macroeconomic imbalances and WTO rules to adjust them to new economic and social 
realities. In terms of the dispute settlement mechanism within the WTO, the EU could make 
an offer of negotiations to reform the current practice allowing DSB Appellate Body judges 
to continue the examination of cases for which they are responsible beyond the end of their 
mandates. However, it is not appropriate for the Appellate Body to challenge the power to 
interpret agreements. This is a demand by the United States so as not to encroach on the 
sovereignty of member states. This would jeopardise the system as a whole since the judges’ 
interpretation is essential, given that no agreement is comprehensive or unambiguous.
The EU should also play a leading role in proposing discussions on rules at plurilateral 
level. Beyond the complaints on formal matters, several WTO members have complaints on 
the substance of rules, in particular when it comes to ensuring fair competition and taking the 
specific features of the Chinese economy into account. While the US trade deficit argument 
has no economic consistency, there remain two substantive issues on which serious negotia-
tions are a priority: the reciprocity of commitments, given the differences in levels of develop-
ment, and the updating of rules on subsidies and state-owned enterprises.
Differences in countries’ revenue levels are currently only considered through special 
and differential treatment, based on the self-reported distinction between three categories: 
developed, developing and least-developed countries. While China, the world’s largest 
exporter of goods, is still considered a developing country, rethinking is needed to make this 
differentiation more graduated by replacing, for example, self-declaration by a system based 
on objective criteria. As regards updating the rules, the fundamental problem is to ensure 
that they allow us to face competition from China on an equitable basis. In their current form, 
they are not suited to Chinese industrial policy, which massively favours strategic sectors 
through a combination of instruments (subsidies, input prices, credit and land allocations, 
trade relations with public or state-influenced companies)9 that distort competition to the 
detriment of its partners bound by European and multilateral rules. The European photovol-
taic panel sector, for example, was not able to withstand heavily subsidised Chinese compe-
tition. Updating the rules implies both defining and limiting the available instruments, the 
information relating to them and the responses that partners can make to protect themselves 
9 See, for example, Wu (2016).
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(in particular, anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures). To overcome blockages associated 
with the consensus rule, plurilateral negotiations, bringing together a critical mass of member 
countries, are the most credible way forward. E-business, moreover, is another issue on which 
such an approach would be welcome, given the virtual absence of rules in this area.
Recommendation 2. At the European level, offer plurilateral negotiations to change the 
WTO’s functioning and rules: operation of the DSB, reciprocity conditions given the 
differences in the level of development and rules relating to subsidies, state-owned 
companies and intellectual property rights.
 
In the event of persistent refusal or blocking by the current US administration of the negotiat-
ing offers put forward by the EU, which seems to be the most likely scenario currently, the EU 
should adopt an alternative short-term damage limitation strategy. The EU and its partners 
then need to identify and analyse all possible strategies for circumventing the US WTO 
blockage, and even to begin implementing them. For example, in order to circumvent the US 
blocking of the DSB in the short term, the EU could organise a club of countries excluding the 
US that would commit to not go to the Appellate Body in the event of appeals filed before the 
WTO.
Recommendation 3. If it is not possible to break the US blockage of the WTO, organise a 
club of countries to identify and implement a bypass strategies.
What role for trade agreements?
Following the failure of the Doha Round negotiations in July 2006, the major trading powers 
began to consider a shift in their trade policies towards bilateralism or regionalism. This was 
in particular the case for the European Commission which, while reasserting its commitment 
to the multilateral system, has considered it necessary to relaunch negotiations on new gen-
eration free trade agreements (FTAs)10 with its main trading partners. This was done “while 
ensuring that the new FTAs would be a stepping stone and not an obstacle to multilateral liber-
alisation” (European Commission, 2006).
Trade agreements essentially institute a reduction in trade barriers between a limited 
number of partners. They are by their very nature discriminatory and thus constitute an 
exception to the fundamental principle of the multilateral system of non-discrimination 
towards trading partners, as allowed by GATT Article XXIV (subject to compliance with 
specific rules). In terms of economic efficiency, these preferential agreements represent a 
second-best situation combining a positive trade-creating effect (through the elimination of 
customs barriers between the countries signing an agreement) with a negative effect through 
the risk of trade diversion detrimental to the countries excluded from such a preferential 
agreement (which may ultimately also have a negative effect on the participating countries). 
Typically, the risk of trade diversion increases with the level of tariffs applied to non-prefer-
ential WTO partners: when these tariffs are low, the level of preference and therefore the level 
of discrimination is low. Positive effects prevail when trade agreements are of the ‘deep’ type, 
with agreements going beyond areas already covered by WTO rules.
10 The first of these agreements was entered into with South Korea and has been in effect since July 2011. Peru and 
Colombia followed on (joined by Ecuador in 2017), together with Canada, Singapore, Vietnam and Japan. Nego-
tiations are still ongoing with MERCOSUR, Chile and Mexico, the latter two countries already having free trade 
agreements with the European Union dating from 2000 and 2002 respectively.
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Who are the winners with trade agreements?
The economic impact of recent or future agreements can be estimated by analysing the effects 
of past trade agreements. This analysis is based on the same methodology used to estimate a 
trade war. The estimated benefits for the EU of an agreement with Japan would thus be 0.07 
percent of GDP, assuming that this agreement corresponds to the ‘average’ of past agree-
ments (Table 1 on the next page). This method is also applied to Switzerland and the Unit-
ed Kingdom (see the Annex), comparing the current situation with the theoretical case of 
these countries no longer having a preferential trade link with the EU. For the main possible 
agreements, the economic benefit for France is between 0.03 percent and 0.23 percent of GDP 
(between €10 and €79 per capita), ie of the same order of magnitude as for the EU as a whole. 
While these benefits may appear small, they are not very different from the benefits estimat-
ed by the OECD of other structural reforms in France (OECD, 2014). The size of the benefits 
varies from one EU country to another primarily in proportion to the intensity of their trade 
relations with the partner concerned, hence the higher figures for Ireland with the United 
States. The countries with the greatest benefits in proportion to their size are those that are 
relatively small and geographically close. Switzerland is the most extreme case. Its benefits 
from a trade agreement are thirty times greater than that of its partner (the EU). The large size 
of the EU therefore creates a significant asymmetry: even if in absolute terms the economic 
benefits to be expected from an agreement are often close between the EU and its partner11, 
they are much higher as a proportion of GDP for the outside country than for the EU. The 
small country benefits strongly from access to a large market while the advantage of access to 
a small market is small for the EU12. The use of this bargaining power in past EU agreements 
is not obvious as regards tariffs, where the practice has been to dismantle them symmetrical-
ly, with the exception of a few sensitive agricultural products. Its use is clear, however, in the 
regulatory field within which the EU imposes its framework to a large extent in trade negotia-
tions. For example, European Union trade agreements systematically include detailed articles 
on public procurement and geographical indications. Recent agreements (with the exception 
of that with Japan) also include the International Court System for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes.
The insurance dimension of trade agreements
The current context of protectionist tensions and threats to multilateralism is bringing about a 
profound change in the scope of trade agreements. While the multiplication of such agree-
ments is likely to be at the expense of multilateralism, they may also represent, for the Euro-
pean Union, an insurance policy in the event of a full-scale trade war with the disappearance 
of the WTO. Such a trade war scenario in which tariff increases do not apply to partners13 with 
which the EU has existing or ongoing trade agreements, has been tested. This insurance policy 
strategy is effective as it reduces trade war losses for the EU and its member states by one 
third (Figure 1). Similar results have been observed in recent empirical studies that show that 
trade agreements, by reducing uncertainty over future demand, act like an insurance policy 
for exporting companies. During the 2008-09 recession, exports thus fell less among countries 
that had signed a trade agreement (Carballo et al, 2015). In addition, preferential agreements 
signed by the EU have a negative impact on countries that are not included in the trade 
agreement: this is the case of the United States, which is harmed by the EU-Canada trade deal. 
These side effects of trade agreements are not what motivates countries to sign them but could 
also be interpreted as retaliatory measures against those who attack multilateralism.
11 In the case of the EU/Switzerland agreement, the benefit is around €19 billion for Switzerland and €17 billion for 
the European Union.
12 Asymmetry is also present in the future agreement with the United Kingdom, which at first sight gives significant 
negotiating power to the EU (see the Annex).
13 Canada, South Korea, Japan, Mexico, Norway, United Kingdom, Switzerland and Turkey.
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Recommendation 4. The European Union should continue to negotiate trade agreements 
both for the conventional economic benefits they provide and also for the insurance 
policy role they can play in the event of a full-scale trade war.
 
However, these agreements need to be part of a new approach consistent with the EU’s non-
trade objectives such as environmental protection or tax cooperation.
Why include objectives other than trade objectives in trade agreements?
The primary objective of the European construction was, through the integration of economies, 
to prevent the return of the conflicts that had ravaged the continent. The current US offensive 
puts this political dimension of trade relations back at centre stage of the debate, since the 
attacks by the US administration go well beyond trade and challenge the transatlantic polit-
ical relationship. The purely economic objective of international trade remains legitimate, of 
course, and the EU’s primary objective should be to safeguard those benefits. What about the 
new trade agreements? As shown in our simulations, the pure economic benefits expected from 
trade agreements are now relatively modest except in three cases: a full-scale trade war where 
they can play an insurance policy role, the future agreement with the UK (Annex) and for small 
countries. Our position is therefore that beyond the conventional efficiency benefits, other 
dimensions of these agreements must be included. Two issues seem essential as they are at the 
heart of concerns about globalisation: the environment with the issue of global warming and 
taxation with the question of tax evasion and optimisation.
The introduction of some non-trade matters is not completely new. It is reflected both in the 
inclusion of chapters on social, environmental and, more generally, sustainable development 
issues in the European Union’s trade agreements: the most recent agreements thus go well 
beyond areas already covered by WTO agreements (‘deep’ agreements).
Two main reasons can be given for including non-trade matters in agreements. They may 
primarily respond to a set of policy preferences (on environmental or fiscal issues). Trade as a 
Table 1: Benefits associated with European Union trade agreements, as a % of GDP per capita
Canada Japan Switzerland US Brazil China India Russia
Countries for which an agreement already exists Countries for which there is no agreement*
Non-EU countries
Canada 0.41 0.00 0.00 – 0.06 0.00 – 0.01 0.00 0.00
Japan 0.00 0.23 0.00 – 0.01 0.00 – 0.01 0.00 0.00
Switzerland – 0.01 – 0.01 3.16 – 0.06 – 0.01 – 0.03 0.00 – 0.02
United States – 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Brazil 0.00 0.00 0.00 – 0.01 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00
China 0.00 0.00 0.00 – 0.01 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.00
India 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 – 0.01 0.26 0.00
Russia 0.00 0.00 0.00 – 0.02 0.00 – 0.02 0.00 1.22
EU and member states
EU 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.26 0.04 0.28 0.04 0.12
Germany 0.03 0.10 0.19 0.31 0.04 0.44 0.04 0.14
Spain 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.05 0.17 0.03 0.05
France 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.23 0.03 0.20 0.04 0.04
Luxemburg 0.03 0.03 0.35 0.68 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.11
Italy 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.16 0.04 0.18 0.03 0.09
Ireland 0.13 0.16 0.20 1.48 0.06 0.27 0.03 0.11
Source: Vicard (2018). Note: * = the benefits shown are potential benefits.
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lever can facilitate cooperation in these areas, and the more intense the trade the more effec-
tive the cooperation.
The steps taken to combat climate change provide a striking illustration of this: while 
the perfect example of the greenhouse effect externality makes international cooperation 
essential, this area offers little incentive for reluctant partners to cooperate. Indeed, it was rea-
soning based on the contrast between the negotiating capabilities in these two areas that led 
Nordhaus (2015) to propose using the threat of a tariff as a mechanism to encourage countries 
not included in a climate change agreement to join it.
On a more economic note, the second reason is the complementarity between trade 
policy and other areas of public policy intervention. Indeed, the adoption of demanding 
regulatory policies entailing additional costs compared to partner countries is likely to have 
trade consequences that are all the greater as trade barriers are low. This distorts comparative 
advantages which become more fiscal and environmental than productive. When it comes 
to putting a price on carbon emissions, the term leakage effects is used to refer to the loss of 
effectiveness of this type of policy associated with the relocation of some polluting production 
to countries where climate policies are less restrictive.
How is this done?
Implementation procedures must be chosen carefully. Firstly, it is preferable to focus on an 
approach based on minima and guarantees. This ensures consistency and sets limits, while 
preserving the freedom of action of partners. This has moreover long been the preferred 
approach on the social dimension of trade agreements, in particular based on requests for the 
application of International Labour Organisation agreements, or in the environmental field 
through related multilateral agreements, which now have to include the Paris Agreement.
Secondly, the objective of effectiveness calls for a combination of cooperation and 
enforceable commitments from the outset of agreements. These commitments may be a 
useful addition as long as they can be based on verifiable criteria, although this is most often 
difficult in social and environmental areas, where the margins for interpretation of commit-
ments and their implementation are broad and difficult to measure. While some areas, such 
as taxation, are more suited to this, the European position remains weak because of its lack of 
internal coordination.
Thirdly, to make non-trade clauses enforceable, it is best to establish in agreements that 
non-compliance may give rise to a trade response, even in the absence of proof of trade 
damage. The clauses concerning the motor vehicle sector in the EU/Japan agreement provide 
a useful example in this respect: a special safeguard measure allows the EU to reintroduce 
tariffs in this sector if Japan does not fully comply with its regulatory commitments to remove 
non-tariff barriers. While these provisions remain in the strictly trade field, they are an 
example of the parallelism established in the agreement itself between tariff and non-tariff 
concessions. Another example is the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, which explicitly 
linked US trade benefits to Vietnam’s commitments on trade-union freedom and workers’ 
rights. Traditionally, the settling of trade disputes has been based on the principle of suspen-
sions of concessions (eg tariff increases) to compensate for damages suffered as a result of 
nonconforming practices of partners. These examples show that it is possible to move towards 
a new system in which suspensions of concessions could respond to the lack of compliance 
with non-trade commitments (not covered by the WTO), even if no direct economic damage 
results. This would greatly facilitate dispute resolution.
Fourthly, the Union must determine the desirable status for non-trade clauses. Should 
they be included in agreements or should trade preferences be made conditional on com-
pliance with specific agreements (eg on sustainable development or tax cooperation)? Since 
trade agreements are part of a wider set of external actions and trade is a tool rather than an 
end in itself, linking them with other separate specific agreements would be more consistent 
than including multiple issues within trade agreements. However, complex legal and prac-
tical issues are involved, as was seen, for example, in the Schubert report (2017) proposing 
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a bilateral climate agreement between the EU and Canada. Indeed, since the agreements 
include clauses related to investment, taxation or the environment, the member states must 
be associated with their adoption14, as the EU strictly speaking loses its exclusive competence 
associated with trade.
Recommendation 5. Adjust trade agreements to ensure that trade goes beyond purely 
economic issues. Prefer an approach of minima and guarantees and combine 
cooperation and enforceable commitments through safeguard clauses or other 
explicit mechanisms.
Trade agreements and tax cooperation
Tax instruments other than customs duties may have an impact on trade terms. This may be 
the case for corporation tax, which is ultimately borne in part by consumers and workers in 
open economies15. A tax advantage that would specifically benefit an exporting sector can 
be considered as an export subsidy whose trade distorting effects can be compared to those 
of customs duties. To be sure, the WTO has a binding instrument regarding direct taxation 
with the agreement on subsidies and compensatory measures, which makes it possible to 
impose trade sanctions on countries that use taxation to give their companies a competitive 
advantage16. However, as this rule only applies to the strict area of trade and cannot be 
applied with regard to tax incentives for investment, the WTO rules need to be changed to 
better take into account the issue of subsidies.
In the tax area, however, states oscillate between defending their sovereignty and acting 
within a multilateral or regional framework to avoid the erosion of their tax bases and to pro-
tect themselves against unfair competition practices17. This is a primary difficulty for the Euro-
pean Union, where tax optimisation issues arise within the EU itself, with countries (often 
small ones) that are also the main beneficiaries of trade agreements and of the European 
integration itself. Moreover, due to the short distance, the initial regulatory situation and the 
presence of a trade agreement, the more trade is integrated between two markets the closer 
the link between trade and taxation. Companies are indeed more mobile in a more integrated 
area, ie it is easier to relocate in one market for tax attractiveness reasons and then re-export 
to another. This aspect must therefore be included in trade agreements with close partners, 
such as the United Kingdom (Annex). While there is now a standard article in the ‘financial 
services’ section of EU Union trade agreements that stipulates “proper fiscal behaviour” (steps 
taken to combat tax evasion, etc), it does not imply any binding legal commitment (as they 
are only ‘best efforts’ commitments) and is not present in all agreements. While it seems 
difficult to be very specific in the tax provisions associated with a trade agreement, compli-
ance with the OECD codes of good practice and the BEPS (Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) 
action plan within a multilateral framework ought to be included as an integral part of future 
agreements18.
14 As stipulated by the EU Court of Justice in its statement (2/15) of 16 May 2017 on the Free Trade Agreement be-
tween the European Union and Singapore.
15 See for example Simula and Trannoy (2009).
16  See, in particular, the dispute between the United States and the European Union relating to foreign sales corporations. 
The question of export subsidies should be raised again in connection with the recent US tax reform, which provides in par-
ticular for lower taxation of income derived from intangible assets when they originate abroad (Foreign Derived Intangible 
Income).
17  According to a recent estimate, up to 40 percent of profits of multinational corporations are transferred to low-tax coun-
tries; see Torslov et al (2018).
18  However, the idea put forward by some economists that trade sanctions can be used to force tax havens outside the 
European Union to change their practices does not seem realistic to us as these countries are only marginally dependent on 
international trade. For such countries, financial sanctions are likely to be much more effective.
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Recommendation 6. Make the signing of trade agreements conditional on the adoption of 
the OECD’s BEPS action plan to combat erosion of the tax base. Put in place gradual 
control and sanction measures to ensure its effective implementation.
The environmental dimension
The environment has a long history in EU agreements, through the pillars of cooperation and, 
since the agreement with South Korea, through the chapters on sustainable development. 
However, the importance of the subject and its links with trade issues calls for renewed ef-
forts, all the more so as the climate has thus far been conspicuously absent from the agree-
ments signed (Schubert, 2017).
Existing EU agreements that include a chapter on ‘Trade and sustainable development’ 
already implicitly imply compliance with the Paris Agreement through the commitment to 
comply with international multilateral climate treaties. It would be desirable for compliance 
with the Paris Agreement to become an explicit sine qua non condition of future EU trade 
agreements, as is already the case in the agreement with Japan and in the renewal of the 
agreement with Mexico. This would mean, on the one hand, that the EU makes it a prerequi-
site for the signing of trade agreements and, on the other, that it makes the full application of 
the agreements conditional upon compliance with the Paris Agreement. The benefit of certain 
trade preferences could be conditional on the proper implementation of the commitments 
in the Paris Agreement: the market access conditions (customs duties and preferential tariff 
quotas) would then be the most favourable when the partner fulfils its commitments, but 
would be less so (within the limits of the conditions under the most-favoured-nation clause) 
if they are not fulfilled. Such a mechanism would create a tangible incentive for both the part-
ner and the EU to fulfil their commitments.
Recommendation 7. Make the ratification and implementation of the Paris Climate 
Agreement a prerequisite for signing a trade agreement with a partner. Make 
the full application of trade preferences conditional on compliance with climate 
commitments, in accordance with explicit provisions.
 
Faced with the aggressive attack on multilateralism by the current US administration, the EU 
must put in place a forceful strategy. It should take the lead in proposing multilateral negotia-
tions on the WTO’s functioning and rules in order to adapt them to the new economic and so-
cial realities. It should continue to negotiate trade agreements that act as insurance policies, 
while linking them to objectives other than trade.
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Annex: Which post-Brexit trade agreement 
with the UK?
Various scenarios for the European Union’s trade relations with the United Kingdom have 
been simulated to estimate their long-term impact. The comparison is made against the cur-
rent situation where the United Kingdom is still an EU member state:
• The absence of a formal agreement that would involve relations governed by the WTO’s 
most-favoured-nation status;
• A standard trade agreement similar to the one signed with Canada;
• A deeper bilateral free trade agreement such as the one with Switzerland;
• A Norway-type Single Market access agreement.
Figure 2 shows that the more ambitious the simulated agreement is, the more limited the 
Brexit-related losses are. The impact on France of the absence of a prefe rential agreement 
with the United Kingdom (–0.3 percent of GDP per capita, or around more than €100 per 
person) is not negligible, but it is much smaller than for the United Kingdom itself (around 
–3 percent, or slightly more than €1,000 per person) or for small countries that are highly 
dependent on their relationship with the United Kingdom such as Ireland or Luxembourg 
(Vicard, 2018). For the European Union, the effect of a lack of agreement would lead to a 0.8 
percent reduction in GDP per capita (or €260 per person).
Figure 2: Scenarios of the consequences of the future post-Brexit agreement, as a 
% of GDP per capita
Source: Vicard (2018).
These figures are fully in line with those obtained in other empirical studies (eg Dinghra et 
al, 2016; Mulabdic et al, 2017; Vandenbussche et al, 2017). In all cases, they conclude that the 
conse quences of a ‘hard’ Brexit are three to four times greater than those of a more optimistic 
scenario.
The future trade agreement with the UK will be exceptional in many respects and could set 
a precedent for new type agreements, giving centre stage to fiscal, competitive, environmental 
and social issues. In this respect, the myriad of bilateral agreements with Switzerland, which 
are a product of history but which create a number of institutional problems (static agree-
ments, very partial consideration of state aid, question of the dispute settlement body) clearly 
appears to the European Commission as a counter-model. The United Kingdom’s geograph-
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ical position and initial situation (as a member of the EU) are such that an agreement should 
probably lie between full access to the single market and a Canadian-style agreement.
However, the economic implications are different because of the UK’s proximity. Unlike 
Canada, the UK could attract companies to its territory through an aggressive industrial 
and fiscal policy, and benefit from access, even imperfect, to the single market. The level of 
ambition in terms of integration of the agreement between the EU and the UK must thus be 
directly linked to the level of ambition of the mechanisms guaranteeing a level playing field* 
between the two partners; in particular as regards state aid** and a dispute settlement mech-
anism. However, there are a number of challenges. On the one hand, the European Union is 
faced with its own contradictions in these negotiations, since this level playing field has not 
been reached within the European Union on the issue of the taxation of corporate profits†, 
even if the use of state aid rules has enabled progress††. On the other hand, while the form this 
monitoring of the rules is to take is crucial, it has yet to be determined. For example, while the 
establishing of an independent domestic state aid monitoring authority would be welcome, 
it would not be sufficient in the event of disagreement as to what constitutes such aid. It is 
not clear whether the decisions taken by the Directorate-General for Competition on Apple’s 
undue tax advantages in Ireland, for example, would also be taken by an independent British 
authority.
* An economic and legal environment that offers everyone an equal chance of success.
** The question of state aid monitoring is also being considered by the European Commission.
† However, the objective is not to converge towards a single rate of taxation on profits, since it is legitimate for small 
peripheral markets to compensate for a lower effective market potential with a tax rate which is itself lower.
†† In recent years, state aid regulation has been used to examine tax agreements negotiated by companies with 
certain governments including Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (see, for example, Apple, Starbucks, 
McDonald’s or Amazon): such agreements not only create competitive distortions but also competition between 
states to attract the profits and jobs of large multinational groups.
